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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between discount rate and risk of expropriation.
One instance is that individuals facing a higher expropriation risk, are more impatient.
This happens because they anticipate consumption when they perceive that their wealth
will be stolen or conﬁscated at some future dates. Another possibility is that the risk
of expropriation makes individuals more patient, because it increases the need for saving
today to face future losses of wealth. Therefore, the relation between risk of expropriation
and discounting might go either ways. This paper identiﬁes conditions that make each of
these two ways consistent with the optimality of the individual behavior. Moreover, we
carry an estimation exercise to establish whether discounting increases or decreases with
expropriation risk.
The paper contributes both to the substantial literature addressing the normative issue
of the appropriate rate of discount for policy evaluation, as well as to the literature that
studies the behavioral properties of individual rates of time preferences. Recent contribu-
tions to the former are Gollier (2002a,b) and Weitzman (2001), who compute the optimal
discount factor, while the latter is surveyed in Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue
(2002).
The theoretical analysis reveals that all risk averse agents, who bear or perceive a greater
risk of expropriation in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance should have a smaller
discount rate. Moreover, we show that all prudent agents, who bear a greater risk of
expropriation in the sense of Second Order Stochastic Dominance (with constant mean),
should have a higher discount rate.
On the empirical side, the paper departs in some respects from the literature. First,
instead of employing an experimental structure with small samples, as most literature does,
we use two large surveys, the Bank of Italy Survey on Households Income and Wealth
(SHIW) and the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 1 The
use of SHIW and SHARE allows us to exploit the ample variation across households in
the perceived risk of expropriation and to control for other factors which might explain
heterogeneity in preferences. Furthermore, our data can help measuring the expropriation
1A notable exception is the paper by Viscusi and Huber (2006), that examines revealed rates of time
preference for public goods, using a survey on environmental quality.
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from the government as well as expropriation coming from criminal oﬀenses. Finally, we
might use measures of impatience based both on direct questions, such as lottery and
windfall gain questions, and on people choice.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the theoretical
background and isolate the conditions that sign the association between discounting and
expropriation risk. Data are described in Section 3, where we introduce our measures of
discounting and of expropriation risk. Section 4 discusses the results from the empirical
exercises and conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Theoretical underpinnings
In this section we provide a model with one period and two dates, t = 0, 1. There is an
agent who maximizes a weighted sum EU of the expected utility of the dates 0 and 1:
EU = u(c0) + E
iv(c1 − x
i).
Functions u and v are thrice-continuous increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions of the agent at dates 0 and 1. We assume that vii(·) ≤ 0 and viii(·) > 0.
Consumption is c0 and c1 − x
i respectively at dates 0 and 1, where xi is the random loss
due to expropriation. The support of xi is in [0, c1] with density f
i(x) and cumulative
distribution function F i(x), where i = 1, 2..., n is the risk of expropriation either real or
perceived by the agent. The distribution of the expropriation risk xi is exogenous.
Following Gollier (2002a), suppose that the agent is considering the possibility to make
an investment at date 0 that would pay at date 1 a return r, that is the investment entails
an outﬂow of 1 unit at date 0 and gives an inﬂow of 1 + r with certainty at date 1. Think
for instance to an health prevention investment like expenditure for mineral water and for
equipments to ﬁlter and purify the water from the tap. Should our agent do the investment?
The answer is in the aﬃrmative if −u
′
(c0) + (1 + r)E
iv
′
(c1 − x
i) ≥ 0, or deﬁning the
discount rate as δi = u
′
(c0)
Eiv
′
(c1−xi)
− 1, if −1 + 1+r
1+δi
≥ 0. Notice that δi is the discount rate
that an agent facing an expropriation risk xi should use to evaluate any project.
While the socially optimal δi depends on many elements, Gollier (2002a) compares the
socially optimal discount rate in an economy where the growth rate is deterministic with
one where it is stochastic and he shows that uncertainty reduces the discount rate and this
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eﬀect is larger the shorter the time horizon.2
In this paper, on the contrary, we are interested in evaluating the eﬀect of a change in
the perceived risk of expropriation on the optimal discount rate. To do this, we compare
δi and δj , the optimal discount rates of two agents characterized respectively by perceived
risk xi and xj .
First of all notice that:
δi ≤ δj ⇐⇒ Eiv
′
(c1 − x
i) ≥ Ejv
′
(c1 − x
j). (1)
It is intuitive that the previous condition will depend, both on the properties of the
utility function and on the conditions on the distribution functions of xi and xj . In the
following, we will consider two natural ways to compare random outcomes: according to
the level of returns, ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance (FSD) and according to the dispersion
of returns, second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). The ﬁrst comparative statics result
for a FSD increase in risk relies on the risk aversion of the agent.
Proposition 1 All agents, who bear (or perceive) a greater risk of expropriation in the
sense of FSD, should have a smaller discount rate δ.
Proof. Expression (1) may be rewritten as
δi ≤ δj ⇐⇒
c1∫
0
v
′
(c1 − x)
[
f i(x)− f j(x)
]
dx ≥ 0
Integrating by parts and simplifying we get:
δi ≤ δj ⇐⇒
c1∫
0
v
′′
(c1 − x)
[
F i(x)− F j(x)
]
dx ≥ 0. (2)
Considering the assumed risk aversion, v
′′
(.) ≤ 0, a suﬃcient condition for δi ≤ δj is
F i(x) ≤ F j(x) for any x, that is xi FSD xj .3
2Formally, he compares δ = u
′
(c)
Ev
′
(c(1+g))
− 1 with δc = u
′
(c)
v
′
(c(1+Eg))
− 1, where g is the per capita growth
rate of consumption.
3FSD is also necessary, in fact if ∃ x such that F i(x) > F j(x) it is always possible to ﬁnd an utility function
v(.) such that Eiv
′
(c1 − x
i) < Ejv
′
(c1 − x
j). Just take an utility function almost linear, v
′′
∼= 0,except in
the interval where F i(x) > F j(x), where v
′′
takes a great value.
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In words, expecting greater risk in the sense of a distribution xi yielding unambiguously
higher loss than a distribution xj, should make the consumer more patient. Going back
to our leading example, the agent should increase his expenditure for mineral water and
for equipments to ﬁlter tap water. First-order stochastic dominance involves the idea of
higher versus lower. We want now to introduce a comparison based on dispersion. To avoid
confusion with the trade-oﬀ between returns and risk we restrict ourselves to distributions
with the same mean. This leads to provide the following proposition, which relies on the
convexity of v
′
.
Proposition 2 All agents, who bear (or perceive) a greater risk of expropriation in the
sense of SSD (with constant means), should have an higher discount rate δ.
Proof. From (2) integrating by parts and simplifying we get
δi ≥ δj ⇐⇒ v
′′
(0)
c1∫
0
(
F i(t)− F j(t)
)
dt +
c1∫
0
v
′′′
(c1 − x)
⎡
⎣
x∫
0
(
F i(t)− F j(t)
)
dt
⎤
⎦ dx ≥ 0.
Integrating once more by parts and using constant means to simplify we have
δi ≥ δj ⇐⇒
c1∫
0
v
′′′
(c1 − x)
⎡
⎣
x∫
0
(
F i(t)− F j(t)
)
dt
⎤
⎦ dx ≥ 0. (3)
Assuming prudence, v
′′′
(.) > 0, a suﬃcient condition for δi ≥ δj is
x∫
0
F i(t)dt ≥
x∫
0
F j(t)dt for
any t, that is xj SSD xi.
This means that expecting a greater risk in the sense of SSD, should make the consumer
more impatient. This individual should then decrease his expenditure for mineral water
and for equipments to ﬁlter tap water. 4
The convexity of marginal utility is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an increase
in future risk to increase savings. Kimball (1990) used the term prudent to deﬁne people
that behave in this way. There are two arguments showing that prudence is an assumption
as realistic as risk aversion. First, many empirical studies have shown that people that
are more subject to future income risks save more (see, for instance, Guiso, Jappelli and
Terlizzese, 1996 and Browning and Lusardi, 1996). Second, prudence is necessary for the
widely accepted assumption that absolute risk aversion is decreasing. The comparative
4xj SSD xi (with constant mean) is equivalent to xi is a mean-preserving spread of xj .
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statics gives then diﬀerent predictions about people optimal behaviour when they face or
perceive diﬀerent future risks. How people intertemporal choices are aﬀected by diﬀerent
perceived future risks? The objective of the empirical analysis is to investigate this question.
3 Data
In order to bring the model to the data, one has to ﬁnd reasonable proxies for δ and x.
The discount rate can be elicited through direct questions or from people’s choice. The
two approaches come with their own advantages and disadvantages, which are surveyed in
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). In this paper, we use a direct measure of
discount rate as well as a measure derived from households consumption decisions.
The literature on institutions has often focussed on the risk of expropriation by govern-
ment. In a number of papers, which are surveyed by Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2004), the risk of expropriation is measured as the risk of “outright conﬁs-
cation and forced nationalization” of property. In this paper, we take a less extreme view
and measure the risk of expropriation by the household perception of the tax system inef-
ﬁciency. Furthermore, since expropriation might come from criminal oﬀenses, the risk of
expropriation is also measured here as the perceived security from crime.
For the empirical exercise presented here, we use two surveys, the Bank of Italy Survey
on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) and the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe (SHARE). The SHIW is a representative sample of the Italian households
population, the SHARE surveys the population of household headed by the 50+ in eleven
European countries:Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
The SHIW is run on a regular basis, on a bi-annual frequency since mid-eighties. More
details on sampling, response rates, processing of results and comparison of survey data
with macroeconomic data are provided by Brandolini and Cannari (1994) and by Biancotti,
D’Alessio, Faiella and Neri (2004).
The SHARE is a relatively new data collection eﬀort that has provided cross-country
and multidisciplinary data on the European old and oldest old. The survey asks detailed
questions on demographics, physical and mental health, employment, income, assets, so-
cial activities, and expectations. All questions are standardized across countries, allowing
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consistent international comparisons. More details on the survey are available from Bo¨rsch-
Supan et al. (2005) to which the interest reader is referred.
3.1 Security
For our purposes, both the SHIW and the SHARE have a number of advantages. The SHIW
1993 wave records information on the perceived security from criminal oﬀenses. Households
are asked to rate between 1 and 10 the security of his/her neighborhood. The average grade
is 5.27, a number, which hides considerable variation within regions and among households.
Between Italian regions, Trentino-Alto Adige, in the far North-East, scores the highest
7, while Puglia and Campania, in Southern Italy, the households grade security 3.38 and
3.46, respectively. The between regional variation is documented in ﬁgure 1, which shows
the map of Italy where more secure regions are displayed in dark colors. The trend in
perceived security conﬁrms the North and South divide, a distinguishing feature of the
Italian economy. Furthermore, in smaller regions, such as Basilicata and Molise security is
relatively high. But the variation is also large within each region. For instance in Sicily
the average grade is 3.92, the standard deviation is 2.23, while in Emilia Romagna, which
belongs to the club of virtuous regions, the standard deviation is much lower, 1.79.
A similar question is available from the drop-oﬀ questionnaire in SHARE, where the
respondents are asked to rate the degree of security in the area they live. The question
is worded as: “How about the area immediately surrounding your accommodation, would
you say it suﬀers from vandalism or crime”. The response is coded as a yes or not. 88%
of the respondent ﬁnd the area they live secure from vandalism and crime. Figure 2 shows
that there are patterns of cross-country diﬀerences, the northern being more secure than
the southern countries, but also diﬀerences within the same country at the individual level.
In order to measure the risk of expropriation by government we use the SHIW 2004,
where it is asked about people perception of the tax system and related matters. Inter-
viewed households are asked to express their agreement (or disagreement) on a number of
statements that refer to the Italian tax system on a scale between 1 (no agreement) to
5 (full agreement). Among such statements, the closest to the amount of expropriation
entailed by taxes is the following: “People try to avoid paying tax because they know the
Government spends the money badly”. While 10.88 percent of the respondents disagree
with this statement, 14.35 fully agrees and 30.67 agrees quite a lot with it. This means that
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according to almost half of the sample the Government ineﬃciency is a good reason for not
paying taxes. We take this as evidence that a non-negligible share of Italians perceive the
tax system as highly predatory.
3.2 Impatience
Impatience is also measured using SHIW 1993, SHIW 2004, and SHARE. Patient households
engage in health prevention investment. A such investment is the expenditure for mineral
water and for equipments to ﬁlter and purify the water from the tap, which is recorded in the
1993 wave of the SHIW. We are not the ﬁrst to use such information as proxy for the degree
of people impatience. Viscusi and Huber (2006) use hypothetical questions to elicit people
willingness to pay for water quality improvement. We focus, however, on actual expenditure
and can control for the perceived quality of water in the neighborhood of residence of the
respondent. Around 65 percent of the sample buy mineral water or ﬁlters and the annual
expenditure among those who buy is 232 euros in 2004 prices.
The 2004 SHIW provides two proxies for the discount factor, both built from hypotheti-
cal questions. The ﬁrst measure of impatience is based on the following question: “Imagine
you were told you had won on the lottery the equivalent of your households net annual
income. The sum will be paid to you in a years time. However, if you give up part of
the sum you can have the rest immediately”. The respondent is then routed in a series of
questions. First, he is asked whether he would give up 5 percent to get money right away.
If he answers yes, he is then asked if he would give up 10 percent; if he answers no, he is
asked if he would give up 3 percent. Those who are willing to give up 10 percent are then
asked if they are willing to give up more, up to 20 percent, while those who are not willing
to give up 3 percent are asked if they are willing to give up 2 percent. The routing proceeds
in such a way that the respondents might want give up between 0 and 20 percent, which
implies a discount factor ranging between 0.8 and 1. Figure 3 helps to visualize how the
discount factor is elicited and ﬁgure 4 plots the distribution of the question. For 12.28%
of the respondents the discount factor is 0.8 or less, 17.80% between 0.8 and 0.9 percent,
while for almost 26 percent of the sample the discount factor is between .98 and 1.
Our ﬁrst measure of discount factor is based on a choice task and is potentially plagued
by procedural nuances, as it happens for many experimental elicitation procedure. 5 There-
5Anchoring is a common problem: the ﬁrst choice they make between diﬀerent alternatives aﬀect subse-
8
fore, we also employ alternative measures of impatience. One, from the SHIW, is based on
the following question: “If you had a windfall equal to your households net monthly income
would you (1) spend it, (2) save a small part, (3) save about half, (4) save most of it, (5)
save it?”. While not aﬀected by anchoring eﬀects, this question oﬀers a less direct measure
of impatience: the respondents provide the propensity to consume out of a transitory shock,
which in turn is aﬀected by patience, as well as by other factors, such as age, that will be
controlled for in the next section. As shown in Figure 5, 30% of household in the SHIW
would spend about half of the amount, and 28% almost equally divide between spending
and saving the whole of the sum. Figure 6 documents the degree of coherence between
the distribution of our two measures of impatience. It is apparent from the ﬁgure that the
percentage of those who would spend the entire windfall gain is larger among those who are
willing to give up at least 20% to cash in the lottery prize one year in advance. Conversely,
those who would save the entire windfall are more prevalent among the respondents who
are not willing to give up anything to cash in the lottery prize in advance.
A question similar to this is available in SHARE. Individuals are asked how much they
would invest or save out of a gift of 12,000 euro. Individuals would save on average 32% of
the gift, and 14% would save the entire amount. 6
Beyond the windfall gain indicator, SHARE provides other variables that have been
used to proxy impatience in the literature on the behavioral properties of individual rates
of time preferences. Recent papers by Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) and Drago (2006)
focus on whether an individual smokes or drinks. This information is available for the
SHARE sample, together with the frequency of physical exercise, which we see as another
health prevention investment. Individuals are asked whether they smoke at the time of
interview, how frequently they drink hard liquor, how frequently they do physical exercise.
The smoking variable is coded as a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 for those who
smokes at the time of the interview, and to zero for those who quit smoking.7 Around 20%
of European old and oldest old still smoke at the time of interview.
The share of smokers ranges from 30% in Sweden, to 60% in Greece, and is generally
quent choices.
6The numbers for Italy in SHARE are not far from SHIW: 26% of the respondents would save the entire
amount, and 28% about half.
7This question is asked only to those who ever smoked in their lives.
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higher in Southern than in Northern countries. 8
The other two variables are instead polychotomous ordered variable. The drinking
variable ranges from 1 to 7 and is equal to one for those who did not drink hard liquor
in the the 6 months before the interview and to 7 for those who drink hard liquor almost
every day. Most old and oldest old Europeans, just below 69%, do not drink hard liquor,
and the share of those who drink hard liquor every day is 1.5%, but is particularly high in
the Netherlands (4%).
The physical exercise variable ranges from 1 to 4 and is equal to 1 for those who hardly
ever or never exercise and to 4 for those who do physical exercise more than once a week.9
A non negligible share of respondents do some physical exercise more than once a week
(37%) and around 38% never exercise. The share of those who exercise more than once a
week is higher in Northern than in Southern Europe and ranges from 47% in Denmark to
28% in Spain.
4 Results
In the estimation exercise we need to control for the other factors, beyond the risk of
expropriation and perceived security, which might aﬀect the degree of people impatience.
We therefore control for age, education, family size, marital status, consumption, income
and type of job dummies. Age is a proxy for time horizon: the young expect to face a longer
horizon than the old and therefore is likely to be more patient, as shown in Viscusi and Huber
(2006). On the other hand, some theories predict that discounting decreases over the lifespan
and others that middle-aged discount less than young and old (see Read and Read, 2004, and
references therein). Moreover, in several non-exponential discounting utility models tastes
change over time. Recent psychological and economic literature has emphasized diﬀerences
between genders in discounting and attitude towards risk (for a survey, see Croson and
Gneezy, 2004). We therefore add a gender dummy to our speciﬁcation. We also include a
dummy for the couples, to allow for couples having a diﬀerent time-horizon than singles.
Education proxies for permanent income and is therefore likely to aﬀect discounting.
8The exception is Denmark, where the share of smokers is 47%, which is much higher than in any other
northern countries.
9The wording of the question is the following: “How often do you engage in vigorous — physical activity,
such as sports, heavy housework, or a job that — involves physical labour?”
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Wealthier individuals are less likely to be constrained and therefore more willing to incur
in expenses that improve future well-being. The interpretation for income is similar. Fur-
thermore, more educated individuals might reveal their-selves as more patient, by the very
fact that they postponed to enter the job market.10
Diﬀerences in attitude towards the future can make people to select into diﬀerent occu-
pations. We therefore add to our regressions two type of job dummies, one for private and
the other for public employees, to ascertain the diﬀerences vis-a`-vis self-employed, which
are often believed to be more willing to take risk.
Table 2 reports the results for the Italian data. The ﬁrst column of the table shows
the coeﬃcients from a probit where the dependent variable is equal to one for those who
purchase mineral water or equipment to ﬁlter the tap water and zero otherwise. Our
speciﬁcation also includes the perceived quality of the water from the tap. The attached
coeﬃcient is negative, in line with expectations, and statistically signiﬁcant. The results
reveal that our measure of security positively aﬀect the probability of purchasing mineral
water (or equipment to ﬁlter the water from the tap). This means that those who ﬁnd their
neighborhoods less secure, and perceive a higher expropriation risk, are less likely to engage
in health prevention expenditure, and therefore are more impatient. Age and age square
are not signiﬁcant, which does not help to disentangle the diﬀerent theories on the relation
between discounting and lifespan. On the other hand, education, which is entered as a
dummy equal to one for high school graduates or more, and income are positively related
to the probability of buying mineral water. This might due to the fact the mineral water
is a normal good, but we cannot rule out that the more educated and the well-do feature
more patience.11
As for the type of job, public employees are more likely to buy mineral water. If public
employees are more risk averse than private employees and self-employed, this result suggests
that risk averse individuals are more willing to incur in health prevention expenditure.
Finally, we see that couples are more likely to buy mineral water and that family size
negatively aﬀect the choice of purchasing mineral water. Couples typically have a longer
10Becker and Mulligan (1997) in their modelling of individual future valuation assume that future utilities
increase according to their vividness. Therefore, they continue, schooling through repeated practice at
problem solving helps children learn the art of scenario simulation, so that educated people should be more
patience.
11Using other proxies of economic well-being, such as wealth or consumption, do not aﬀect the results.
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planning horizon than singles, and might therefore be more inclined to invest in health
prevention. Family size instead might be a further proxy for economic conditions. Larger
families are more likely to lie in the bottom percentiles of the income distribution.
To distinguish the eﬀect of the factors aﬀecting the decision to buy mineral water form
those aﬀecting the amount spent for mineral water (or equipment to ﬁlter the water from
the tap), we regress the log-expenditure for mineral water on our proxy for expropriation
risk, the perceived quality of tap water, age, age squared, income, consumption, education,
marital status, family size and employment dummies. The results are reported in the second
column of table 2 and conﬁrm that health prevention expenditure decreases with risk of
expropriation. The sign of the other coeﬃcients is the same across the two columns of
table 2, except that of family size, which turns to be positive, in line with the idea that
conditional on buying, larger families consume more than smaller ones.
The estimation also focuses on the risk of expropriation by government and relates it
to impatience, as measured by the two hypothetical questions described above. The results
are presented in the last four columns of 2. The third column of the table concentrates on
the proxy of impatience based on the lottery question, which ranges from 1 (discount factor
less 80 percent) to 6 (100 %). In column fourth the dependent variable is obtained from
the windfall gain question and takes 5 values, 1 if the whole windfall gain is spent, 5 if it
is saved. Since the dependent variable, whatever measure of impatience is considered, are
ordered polycothomous estimation employs an ordered probit model.
The results imply that patience decreases with the risk of expropriation from the gov-
ernment: the higher tax eﬃciency, the larger the discount factor. The coeﬃcients on the
other variables, whenever signiﬁcant, broadly conﬁrm the evidence reported in the ﬁrst two
columns of table 2. Overall, the results imply that the risk of expropriation, whether private
or public, makes individual more impatient.
One might wonder if the results are biased by omitted factors, such as the degree of
people optimism. For instance, suppose that optimistic individuals perceive a lower risk
of expropriation. Depending on whether they engage in more or less health prevention
activities, the relation between discounting and risk of expropriation will be biased in one
way or in the other. Therefore, to account for the possibility that psychological traits lie
behind our results, we estimate our model using a proxy for the degree of happiness, which
is provided by the 2004 SHIW. Individuals are asked to rate their degree of happiness on
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a scale between 1 (“Very unhappy”) and 10 (“Very happy”).12 The results are reported in
the last two columns of 2 and show that the estimated coeﬃcients are not aﬀected, and that
the variable measuring the degree of happiness is signiﬁcant for the lottery question proxy
and positively signed.
Looking at the other proxies for patience taken from the European data-set does not
alter the overall picture. The results show that the higher the perceived security from
criminal oﬀenses, the lower the probability of smoking, of drinking heavily, and the higher
the probability of doing physical exercise and the propensity to save a windfall gain. Table 3
reports in the ﬁrst column the results from regressing the propensity to save out of a windfall
gain. These and the other estimates with the SHARE data are obtained accounting for the
fact that missing data have been imputed. Details on the imputation of missing data can
be found in Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2005).13 The coeﬃcient on our proxies for the degree of
security from criminal oﬀenses is positive, suggesting that more security is associated with
a higher propensity to save out of a windfall gain, and therefore to more patience. The
second column of table 3 estimates a probit for the smoking variable. Here, the coeﬃcient
on security is negative, which implies that more security is associated with less smoking and
therefore conﬁrms that individuals perceiving a lower risk of expropriation engage more in
health prevention behaviors, and thus are more patient. The results in the last two columns
refer to the hard liquor and to the physical exercise variables. Perceiving a lower risk of
expropriation (high security) means a lower propensity to drink hard liquor and a higher
propensity to do physical exercise, which is in line with the idea that more security entails
more patience.
Finally, we check whether the results are driven by some psychological trait, such as
optimism or happiness, which causes patience and perceived security to move together.
Table 4 modiﬁes the baseline speciﬁcation to account for people answers to the following
question: “Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the statement: I’m always
optimistic about my future”.14 Controlling for the degree of people optimism does not
12The wording of the question is: “Looking at every aspect of your life, how happy would you say you
are?”
13In SHARE missing data are imputed using a multiple imputation methodology based on van Buuren,
Brand, Groothuis-Oudshoorn and Rubin (2005). The imputation procedure generates ﬁve implicates and
the models are estimated on each implicate. The results from the estimation on each implicate are combined
following Rubin (1987).
14The respondent is asked to either strongly agree, or agree, or neither agree or disagree, or disagree or
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change the overall picture, as shown in table 4: the signs and orders of magnitude are
similar to that of table 3.
5 Conclusions
This paper addresses the following question: individuals facing higher expropriation risk
are more (or less) impatient? The theoretical analysis identiﬁes the conditions that make a
positive (negative) association between discounting and expropriation risk consistent with
individual optimizing behavior. It is shown that all risk averse individuals who bear a
greater risk of expropriation in the sense of FSD should have a smaller discount rate, and
that all prudent agents, who bear a greater risk of expropriation in the sense of SSD (with
constant means), should have an higher discount rate.
We also provide an empirical exercise, which exploit the ample cross-sectional variability
oﬀered by a national representative sample, the SHIW, and by a representative sample of
the 50+ in eleven European countries. The two surveys give direct and indirect measures
of discounting and provides proxies for expropriation from government and expropriation
from criminal oﬀenses. The results suggest that discounting increases with expropriation
risk, which is consistent with optimality if prudent individuals perceive a greater risk of
expropriation as an increase in the dispersion of returns.
strongly disagree.
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Figure 1: Security between Italian regions
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Figure 2: Security between European countries
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Figure 3: Imagine you were told you had won on the lottery the equivalent of your house-
holds net annual income. The sum will be paid to you in a years time. However, if you give
up part of the sum you can have the rest immediately. To get the money right away would
you give of this sum?
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Figure 4: Imagine you were told you had won on the lottery the equivalent of your house-
holds net annual income. The sum will be paid to you in a years time. However, if you give
up part of the sum you can have the rest immediately. To get the money right away would
you give of this sum?
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Figure 5: If you had a windfall equal to your households net monthly income would you
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Figure 6: Two measures of impatience
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Table 1: Summary statistics
SHIW 1993 SHIW 2004 SHARE
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Age 53.72 53.00 55.18 54.00 65.08 64
Disposable income 28.72 23.05 30.26 24.04 143.87 30.99
Male 0.72 0.61 0.449
High school or more 0.27 0.39 0.50
Couple 0.70 0.62 0.75
Family size 2.85 3.00 2.52 2.00 2.21 2
Public employees 0.14 0.11 0.04
Private employees 0.22 0.23 0.23
Self-employed 0.18 0.16 0.07
The reported statistics are computed using sample weights. Income is expressed
in thousands 2004 euro.
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Table 2: Mineral Water and Windfall gain
Mineral Water Windfall gain
Security:
Criminal oﬀenses 0.020 0.011 0.158
(0.008)* (0.005)* (0.057)**
Tax system 0.130 0.141 0.130
(0.056)* (0.057)* (0.056)*
Age -0.003 0.008 0.016 -0.005 0.019 -0.005
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008)* (0.008) (0.008)* (0.008)
Age square 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)
Disposable income 0.010 0.005 0.004 -0.000 0.003 -0.000
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)
Male -0.066 0.005 -0.019 -0.037 -0.021 -0.037
(0.052) (0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
High school or more 0.291 0.003 0.054 -0.025 0.037 -0.025
(0.043)*** (0.025) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Couple 0.189 0.107 0.138 0.117 0.094 0.115
(0.055)*** (0.033)** (0.050)** (0.050)* (0.051) (0.051)*
Family size -0.076 0.108 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003
(0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Public employees 0.192 0.049 0.109 0.028 0.095 0.028
(0.060)** (0.036) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
Private employees 0.080 0.012 0.006 0.017 -0.000 0.016
(0.055) (0.035) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Self-employed 0.060 0.019 0.027 0.016 0.020 0.016
(0.060) (0.038) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067)
Quality of tap water -0.216 -0.080
(0.007)*** (0.004)***
Happiness 0.050 0.001
(0.010)*** (0.010)
Observations 7783 5101 3798 3798 3798 3798
Standard errors in parentheses. One star means signiﬁcant at 5%; two signiﬁcant at 1%;
three at 0.1%. In the ﬁrst column the dependent variable is an indicator that takes value
one for those who purchase mineral water or equipment to ﬁlter the tap water. In the second
column the dependent variable is the log of such expenditure. In the third and ﬁfth column
the dependent variable is our indicator of discounting, which ranges from 1 (discount factor
less 80 percent) to 6 (100 %). In the fourth and sixth column the dependent variable is an
indicator which takes 5 values, 1 if the whole windfall gain is spent, 5 if it is saved. The ﬁrst
column reports probit estimates, the second OLS estimates and the third to the sixth ordered
probit estimates. The variable security measures risk of expropriation from criminal oﬀenses
in the ﬁrst and second column and from the state in the third to sixth column. All regressions
feature regional dummies.
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Table 3: Discounting in Europe: Baseline speciﬁcation
Windfall gain Smoking Heavy drinking Physical activity
Security 0.028 -0.144 -0.115 0.062
(0.009)** (0.045)** (0.037)** (0.029)*
Age -0.003 -0.036 -0.012 -0.023
(0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)***
Income before taxes -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.032 -0.265 0.523 0.101
(0.006)*** (0.031)*** (0.024)*** (0.019)***
High school or more -0.021 -0.109 0.046 0.026
(0.007)** (0.034)** (0.027) (0.022)
Couple -0.003 -0.226 -0.050 0.136
(0.008) (0.044)*** (0.035) (0.026)***
Family size -0.001 -0.011 -0.014 -0.012
(0.004) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012)
Public employee 0.007 -0.191 -0.044 -0.070
(0.016) (0.072)** (0.057) (0.048)
Private employee -0.003 -0.072 -0.027 0.154
(0.009) (0.041) (0.033) (0.027)***
Self-employed 0.013 0.001 0.084 0.339
(0.013) (0.059) (0.045) (0.039)***
Health status
Very Good 0.021 0.093 0.048 -0.176
(0.010)* (0.046)* (0.034) (0.029)***
Good 0.012 0.090 0.002 -0.367
(0.010) (0.046) (0.035) (0.030)***
Fair 0.012 0.094 -0.093 -0.746
(0.012) (0.057) (0.046)* (0.036)***
Poor -0.004 0.246 -0.310 -1.233
(0.017) (0.083)** (0.083)*** (0.058)***
Observations 14230 7697 11518 15886
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses. One star means signiﬁcant
at 5%; two signiﬁcant at 1%; three at 0.1%. In the ﬁrst column the dependent variable is
the percentage of a windfall gain that the respondent would save. In the second column the
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondent in smoking and zero
otherwise. In the third column the dependent variable is polychotomous ordered that ranges
from 1 to 7 and is equal to one for those who did not drink hard liquor in the the 6 months
before the interview and to 7 for those who drink hard liquor almost every day. In the fourth
column the dependent variable is polychothomous ordered variable that ranges from 1 to 4 and
is equal to 1 for those who hardly ever or never exercise and to 4 for those who do physical
exercise more than once a week. In the ﬁrst column a linear model is estimated, in the second
column, a probit model, in the third and fourth an ordered probit. All models are estimated
via maximum likelihood, except for the linear model, which is estimated via ordinary least
squares. All regressions feature country dummies.
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Table 4: Discounting in Europe: Robustness checks
Windfall gain Smoking Heavy drinking Physical activity
Security 0.029 -0.144 -0.122 0.060
(0.009)** (0.046)** (0.037)** (0.029)*
Age -0.004 -0.036 -0.012 -0.023
(0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)***
Income before taxes 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.033 -0.265 0.528 0.098
(0.006)*** (0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.019)***
High school or more -0.021 -0.101 0.043 0.029
(0.007)** (0.034)** (0.027) (0.022)
Couple -0.000 -0.225 -0.054 0.130
(0.009) (0.044)*** (0.036) (0.026)***
Family size -0.001 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
(0.004) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012)
Public employee 0.006 -0.194 -0.047 -0.063
(0.016) (0.073)** (0.057) (0.048)
Private employee -0.004 -0.080 -0.026 0.156
(0.009) (0.042) (0.033) (0.027)***
Self-employed 0.012 -0.005 0.087 0.338
(0.013) (0.059) (0.046) (0.040)***
Health status
Very Good 0.018 0.104 0.049 -0.167
(0.010) (0.046)* (0.034) (0.030)***
Good 0.006 0.101 0.013 -0.347
(0.010) (0.047)* (0.036) (0.030)***
Fair 0.004 0.107 -0.069 -0.721
(0.012) (0.058) (0.047) (0.037)***
Poor -0.013 0.254 -0.302 -1.184
(0.018) (0.085)** (0.085)*** (0.060)***
Optimistic about the future
Agree -0.006 0.476 0.169 0.173
(0.018) (0.063)*** (0.046)*** (0.044)***
Neither agree or disagree 0.376 0.259 -0.208 0.187
(0.015)*** (0.063)*** (0.045)*** (0.039)***
Disagree 0.308 0.164 -0.254 0.104
(0.014)*** (0.055)** (0.045)*** (0.038)**
Strongly disagree 0.214 0.156 0.301 -0.136
(0.016)*** (0.074)* (0.049)*** (0.044)**
Observations 13960 7558 11285 15580
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses. One star means signiﬁcant
at 5%; two signiﬁcant at 1%; three at 0.1%. In the ﬁrst column the dependent variable is
the percentage of a windfall gain that the respondent would save. In the second column the
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondent in smoking and zero
otherwise. In the third column the dependent variable is polychotomous ordered that ranges
from 1 to 7 and is equal to one for those who did not drink hard liquor in the the 6 months
before the interview and to 7 for those who drink hard liquor almost every day. In the fourth
column the dependent variable is polychothomous ordered variable that ranges from 1 to 4 and
is equal to 1 for those who hardly ever or never exercise and to 4 for those who do physical
exercise more than once a week. In the ﬁrst column a linear model is estimated, in the second
column, a probit model, in the third and fourth an ordered probit. All models are estimated
via maximum likelihood, except for the linear model, which is estimated via ordinary least
squares. All regressions feature country dummies.
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